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Abstract: Privacy and security requirements, and their potential conflicts, are increasingly having more and 
more importance. It is becoming a necessary part to be considered, starting from the very early stages of 
requirements engineering, and in the entire software engineering cycle, for the design of any software system. 
In the last few years, this has been even more emphasized and required by the law. A relevant example is the 
case of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires organizations, and their software 
engineers, to enforce and guarantee privacy-by-design to make their platforms compliant with the regulation. 
In this context, complex activities related to privacy and security requirements elicitation, analysis, mapping 
and identification of potential conflicts, and the individuation of their resolution, become crucial. In the 
literature, there is not available a comprehensive requirement engineering oriented tool for supporting the 
requirements analyst. In this paper, we propose ConfIs, a tool for supporting the analyst in performing a 
process covering these phases in a systematic and interactive way. We present ConfIs and its process with a 
realistic example from DEFeND, an EU project aiming at supporting organizations in achieving GDPR 
compliance. In this context, we evaluated ConfIs by involving privacy/security requirements experts, which 
recognized our tool and method as supportive, concerning these complex activities. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts arising between different requirements, 
such as privacy and security, are a common problem 
in engineering software systems [1]. Conflicts in 
software requirements are inevitable because of the 
nature of software development for realistic systems, 
and conflicts, therefore, are the most common cause 
of inconsistencies during the software development 
process [2]. Every case of conflict based on 
requirements is surrounded by complex issues, and 
these issues should be taken into consideration when 
resolving the conflicts [3]. Security and privacy 
requirements should be considered essential for every 
software system. Privacy has become a mainstream 
topic, and especially problematic for software 
development companies. Problems around misuse of 
presumed personal data by organizations, especially 
social media companies, has led to moves to 
‘guarantee’ privacy at legislative levels, as envisioned 
in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) [4]. However, from the developer’s point of 
view, certain issues crop up when adhering to security 
requirements, while others appear when adhering to 
privacy requirements. This can lead to conflict when 
trying to meet these requirements, and it is now 
necessary for developers to manage these conflicts in 
order to be compliant with GDPR. However, there is 
a degree of complexity within these conflicting 
requirements that makes resolution less immediately 
obvious. Recourse to the business objective is one 
way to determine whether a security requirement 
outweighs its privacy conflict in aiming to achieve 
compliance with GDPR. The first step in this type of 
conflict resolution is to be able to identify the conflict 
in the first place: this paper outlines an approach for 
doing so. 
In the context of software development, a conflict 
is defined as a clash of interests in the development 
environment between privacy and security 
requirements [5]. Such a conflict could arise at any 
point in the Systems Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC), irrespective of whether an agile, traditional 
or hybrid approach is used. Regardless of the 
approach, it is less costly to identify incorrect 
requirements – and here we can add privacy and 
security requirements [6] – in the requirements phase 
than to do so later [2]. For example, 
pseudonymization (privacy requirement) may 
conflict with the need for authentication (security 
requirement) to avoid a data breach. While such 
conflicts are common, the challenge is to balance 
them without creating the opportunity for an easier 
breach of privacy or security. Conflicts arising from 
incompatible requirements can negatively affect 
information systems, even if controls are put in place 
[1, 2 and 3]. Consequently, it is preferable to manage 
conflicts that are identified early in the lifecycle, 
before they derail the entire project. However, a 
requirement conflict can still affect the development 
of information systems and their successful 
deployment, even after controls have been put in 
place to manage conflict or resolve it [5].  
Data breaches are a key concern for businesses 
with large amounts of personal data, such as banks 
and governmental departments, as such systems are 
the most frequently targeted, accounting for nearly 
80% of all incidents disclosed [7]. Commercial 
organizations are also at risk. For example, TalkTalk, 
a telecoms provider, was hit with a record £400K fine 
for a data breach in 2015 that exposed the private 
details of more than 150,000 customers [8].   
GDPR forces organizations to implement changes 
that relate to the use of personal data as well as its 
protection. GDPR empowers citizens to take greater 
control of their personal data by having a say in the 
use of their data. Organizations are required to keep 
track of the use of user data, which allows the relevant 
authorities (such as individuals) to give consent with 
ease. Despite the advantages of GDPR, it can be hard 
to apply for several reasons, including complexities 
involved in measures put in place by companies to 
enhance security. These complexities can lead to 
conflicts in addition to the complexity involved in 
covering various aspects of data protection. Most of 
the existing approaches in the literature [9, 10 and 11] 
do not provide adequate solutions to identify and 
resolve conflicts between security and privacy 
requirements. Identifying and resolving such 
conflicts are essential to mitigate threats to software 
systems, as unresolved conflicts could make a system 
vulnerable to threats.  
 
 
This paper is based on our previous work 
Alkubaisy (2017, 2019), and here we present the final 
framework. This paper provides a novel structured 
framework that fulfils the gap of the current state of 
the art. Above all, this paper addresses the following 
Research Questions (RQs): 
 
RQ1: How to design a framework supporting the 
analyst to identify and resolve conflicts between 
privacy and security requirements? 
 
RQ2: How to support the analyst in the identification 
and resolution of conflicts between requirements in a 
systematic and tool-supported way in real cases? 
 
RQ1 will be addressed by extending SecTro, a 
requirement modelling tool [18]. The proposed 
framework offers the analyst a process or guide to 
help him in identifying and resolving conflicts. The 
presented framework will be validated using one part 
of the DEFeND project [13] to ensure that this 
framework is GDPR compliant.  
 
RQ2 will be addressed by reviewing the current 
methods to identify conflicts between requirements, 
and by introducing ConfIS framework phases to help 
the analyst to locate conflicts between requirements.  
 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the baseline from which we started 
and based our work. These parts are phases of the 
theoretical framework, DEFeND project where the 
framework has been applied, and answers to RQ1. 
Section 3 addresses RQ2 by proposing Tool-
Supported Conflict Identification, Resolution and 
application of these within DEFeND, showing and 
discussing our Case Study. Section 4 evaluates the 
proposed ConfIS framework. Related work and 
conclusion are presented respectively in Sections 5 
and 6. 
2  BASELINE AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
   This section presents an overview of the key parts 
presented in this paper. This paper is based on our 
previous work Alkubaisy (2017, 2019), and here we 
present the final framework based on the previous 
work. The first part presents our proposed theoretical 
framework, enhanced with an explanation of each 
phase. We then explain more about the DEFeND 
project [14,16], an ongoing live project aiming to 
determine needs related to identifying conflicts and 
conflict resolution. An overview of the SecTro tool, 
which has been extended to fulfil the requirements of 
our proposed framework, is presented at the end of 
this section. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework Phases 
Our proposed framework has a sequence of phases to 











As Fig. 1 illustrates, some of the steps are semi-
automated, while the others are manual steps, based 
on the analyst’s point of view.  
The partners might have a special perspective on 
requirements. First, the conflicts between 
requirements are identified, based on a matrix 
presented by a previous study [14]. Hence, we sort the 
requirements that could lead to a potential conflict. 
After identifying the requirements that are in 
conflicts, the analyst must decide whether this kind of 
conflict would affect the system, based on the 
presented scenarios. Therefore, the first phase of the 
framework is performed manually by the software 
requirements analyst. Phase Two identifies the 
potential conflicts between requirements that were 
detected in the previous phase. The final phase 
proposes conflict resolution patterns by matching the 
problem to a resolution pattern for each conflict that 
the analyst might face. Those patterns act as a 
reference for the analyst to resolve conflicts between 
requirements. The final phase of our framework is 
automated by using the SecTro tool (by importing a 
privacy pattern library). 
 
 
2.2 DEFeND Project 
   The DEFeND project was designed as an EU 
project to support organizations by defining essential 
tools and methods that enable organizations and 
authorities to monitor their actions so that they can be 
GDPR-compliant [13]. DEFeND stands for Data 
govErnance For supportiNg gDpr. DEFeND aims at 
improving existing frameworks and software tools, 
and developing and designing new integration 
software based on market needs. This is with the aim 
of delivering a unique data platform for privacy 
governance.  
   In order to achieve GDPR compliance and raise 
awareness of the diverse features of GDPR, DEFeND 
will deliver a platform which empowers 
organizations in various sectors to assess their 
compliance status. The DEFeND platform allows for 
designing and analysing models following a Privacy-
by-Design approach. The DEFeND platform provides 
five main services to organizations and relevant 
stakeholders: Data Scope Management Service, Data 
Process Management Service, Data Breach 
Management Service, GDPR Planning Service and 
GDPR Reporting Service. Each of these services 
assists organizations in collecting, analysing and 
operationalizing different aspects and articles of 
GDPR, and providing appropriate reporting 
capabilities.  
Figure 1: The phases of the proposed theoretical 
framework 
   The DEFeND platform will be in a live laboratory 
pilot studies in four different areas: healthcare, 
finance (or banking), energy and local public 
administration. The DEFeND platform will be tested 
in an effective environment in three scenarios through 
two different types. The first type focuses on the 
GDPR compliance process for end users, while the 
second addresses GDPR implications for external 
stakeholders. Our proposed framework will identify 
and resolve conflicts between requirements by 




SecTro tool has been used to aid in the modelling 
of conflicts resolution [15]. It implements the Secure 
Tropos Methodology which consists of an 
engineering approach for security and privacy 
requirements, starting from early-stage requirements 
of the IS (Information System) development process. 
Secure Tropos must be specified in the early phases 
of an IS development, as it is an organized approach 
for goal-oriented security and privacy requirement 
modelling. The Secure Tropos methodology supports 
a modelling language, security aware processes and 
automated processes. The Secure Tropos 
methodology enhances our framework by translating 
conflicts between requirements in a goal model. 
SecTro presents models that contain security and 
privacy requirements [16]. It involves modelling 
views which are used to facilitate system design and 
elicitation of security and privacy requirements.   
3 TOOL-SUPPORTED CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND CASE 
STUDY 
   To solve the conflicts between requirements, we 
explored critical conflicts from literature review, 
research studies and European Projects. The needs 
come also from a discussion with stakeholders from 
different domains, such as banking, healthcare, public 
administration, and smart energy; all of which need to 
achieve GDPR compliance. In addition, we found that 
conducting a requirement analysis on Privacy-by-
Design, found potential conflicts that could not be 
solved. Hence, on behalf of DEFeND – a European 
Project - we have interviewed those stakeholders in 
relation to how to create platforms to address such 
conflicts.  
Achieving GDPR compliance is very complex. To 
do so, requirements analysis must be conducted, in 
which many conflicts arise, and stakeholders may 
have great difficulty in understanding how to manage 
and solve them. Moreover, we found that performing 
requirements analysis on Privacy-by-Design in real 
cases is essential, according to the stakeholders. We 
recognize that stakeholders need to achieve GDPR 
compliance via Privacy-by-Design, and they consider 
this as a problem. In addition, as mentioned above, 
there is a lack of recent studies which addresses this 
issue. Stakeholders need a tool to resolve the 
identified conflicts more quickly by reducing their 
effort and having a ready-to-use solution of any of the 
conflicts that could arise.  
3.1 Motivation Scenario 
   As we discussed earlier, within the DEFeND 
project section, it comprises several services. The 
Centre for Secure, Intelligent and Usable Systems at 
the University of Brighton works on one of 
DEFeND’s services; Data Scope Management 
(DSM) which supports Privacy by Design (PbD). 
DSM developed a case study which has been used as 
a storyline, to regard highly valuable PbD activities 
of DSM. In [17], the DSM service has been widely 
discussed by describing its flow phase by phase, and 
by using the storyline. In this paper, we will illustrate 
one example from the storyline and apply the ConfIS 
framework phase by phase to identify and resolve 
the conflicts between security and privacy 
requirements. The example being applied in the 
ConfIS framework is as follows: 
One of the most critical aspects is to manage 
patients’ medical record, have verification from 
a supervisor for any changes happening to it, and 
establish a retention period for the data. 
     In section 3.4 we will analyse this example and 
find out the related security and privacy requirements. 
Therefore, we will apply the ConfIS framework phase 
by phase to resolve conflicts. 
 
3.2 Integrating the Theoretical 
Framework in SecTro 
   The SecTro tool has been extended with new 
concepts to support the analyst in identifying and 
resolving conflicts. The theoretical framework was 
completely integrated and implemented in the top of 
SecTro, with its analysis supporting all phases. Here, 
the case study shows in more details, diagrams from 
the tool that are integrated with the theoretical 
framework.  
   Moreover, the new concepts are added to the 
privacy by design view of SecTro to support the 
modelling of requirements conflicts. Phase two 
involves identifying conflicts between requirements 
according to the output from phase one. At This Point, 
the analyst needs to make conflict decisions based on 
each scenario and the relevant requirements. Next, in 
phase three, new concepts are added to identify 
conflicts; based on the out-come of phase two, the 
analyst will locate these conflicts. The next section 
describes the case study in further depth and applies 
the theoretical framework to achieve conflict 
resolution.  
 
3.3 Tool Description in a Case 
Study 
   Based on the motivation example, we will illustrate 
the security and privacy requirements, following the 
phases of the ConfIS framework to resolve conflicts, 
using the extended supported tool. The first phase 
aims to map the security and privacy requirements 
[12]. This assumes the existence of a matrix to find 
out the potential conflicts between security and 
privacy requirements, based on our recent study [14]. 
The next sections show the application of our 
proposed framework phases in identifying and 
resolving conflicts, discusses the application of the 
motivation example in SecTro, and presents the 
theoretical framework to identify and resolve 
conflicts (3.4-3.6). 
3.4 Phase 1: Mapping Security 
and Privacy Requirements  
Based on the motivation scenario presented in section 
3.1, we find that there are security and privacy 
requirements involved. Therefore, to determine 
which requirements are in conflict, we model the 
scenario using the organizational view of SecTro as 
presented in Figure 2. Each bubble represents an actor 
(i.e. Supervisor, Doctor, and Employee). We break 
the scenario into several tasks to assign a related 
requirement for it, and assign each task to a related 
requirement, to find out which task has a potential 
conflict. The Doctor needs to acquire patient medical 
results from an Employee, while sending this sort of 
information needs to be confidential and treated with 
integrity. When the Doctor runs a patient examination 
or updates patient medical records, this task must 
remain Anonymous. On the other hand, the same data 
needs to be validated by a Supervisor; hence, this task 
requires some Accountability. Any updates on patient 
medical records by the Doctor also needs to be 
Accountable based on GDPR Principles. As a result, 
each task has its own security and privacy 
requirements, which helps in identifying the 
conflicting requirements. For instance, anonymity as 
a privacy requirement conflicts with accountability as 
a security requirement. In Fig. 2, we model the 
motivation example in SecTro to pinpoint these 
conflicts. 
 
3.5 Phase 2: Identify Conflicts 
between Requirements and 
Conflict Decisions  
To identify conflicts, we next divide each scenario 
task to address the possible conflicts. Therefore, for 
each case, we assign the involved requirements. 
Based on the “Managing Patient Records” scenario 
presented, we will address the security and privacy 
requirements for each activity. For instance: The lab 
must perform a medical examination, then send the 
results to the doctor (security requirements: 
confidentiality and integrity). Furthermore, medical 
results will be sent to the doctor to update the patient’s 
medical record; this action must be compatible with 
the GDPR accountability principle. Furthermore, 
while the doctor is updating the patient’s medical 
record, this action should be anonymous. This 
therefore could lead to conflicts between 
requirements- accountability and anonymity. To 
process the updated results, they should be verified by 
a supervisor; therefore, this requirement involves 
accountability as a security requirement. In addition, 
updating the patients’ medical record involves 
anonymity, to keep the patients’ record private, 
according to Privacy-by-Design principles. On the 
other hand, this update must be accountable to the 
supervisor to keep the system secure and accurate; the 
supervisor must be aware of every and final updates 
being made and by whom. At this point conflicts is 
likely to occur between anonymity as a privacy 
requirement and accountability as a security 
requirement. This task can require more than one 
requirement involved which will have potential 
conflicts arising between requirements, especially 
based on privacy and security requirements. It is 
therefore difficult to fulfil both requirements. 
Accountability is the requirement that holds entities 
responsible for their actions, while anonymity allows 
entities to use resources or services without having to 
reveal their identity. In Figure 3, we provide an 
overview of the Privacy-by-Design view of 
Managing Patient Records. In this view, we allocate 










































































































Figure 2: Organization View of Managing Patient Records 
 
Figure 3: Privacy by Design View of Managing Patient Records 
 
 
As discussed above, we have already identified 
a conflict between accountability related to the 
supervisor and anonymity related to the doctor. In 
this phase, we only highlight the conflict issue. 
Figure 4: Conflict Resolution 
Pattern  
 
Figure 5: Integrating conflict resolution in Privacy-by-Design view of Managing Patient Records 
3.6 Phase 3: Conflict Resolution 
Patterns 
 
In this phase, for each type of conflicts, we model a 
pattern to link two conflicting requirements, and a 
suitable supporting tool. 
To resolve a conflict via supported tools, we 
identified a relevant tool that could satisfy both types 
of privacy and security requirements. By applying 
this scenario in SecTro, we must add the tool to the 
Privacy Pattern Library. In this case, we identify two 
supporting tools, but determine that the IDEMIX tool 
is more appropriate [19]. Figure4 shows how we add 
the supporting tool into the framework. 
Consequently, Figure.5 shows the Privacy-by-Design 
view after adding the new concepts to identify 
conflict between requirements and imports a suitable 





































4 DISCUSSION  
There is a need to fulfil the anonymity requirement 
for the Update Patient Medical Record process, 
making sure that nobody knows which doctor has 
made the change on a record. This is fulfilled by the 
mechanism, which IDEMIX fulfils our solution 
requirement. In addition, the accountability constraint 
is related to the validate aspect of the Add Medical 
Exam process, i.e., a supervisor needs to validate the 
change. However, for this, the supervisor needs to 
know which doctor made the change; thus, there is a 
conflict between accountability and anonymity, 
because the supervisor cannot know, due to the 
anonymity requirement, who the doctor is, so 
accountability cannot be fulfilled. We solve this by 
introducing the IDEMIX mechanism, which will be 



















IDEMIX is a solution for minimizing the release of 
personal information and can be based on one of 
many proposed techniques for anonymizing the 
transport medium used between users and service 
providers. IDEMIX is an optimizing cryptographic 
compiler that achieves an unprecedented level of 
assurance, without sacrificing the practicality for a 
comprehensive class of cryptographic protocols. This 
protocol satisfies the conditions for anonymous, 
authenticated, and accountable transactions between 
users and service providers. On the lab side, the 
employee should fulfil confidentiality and integrity 
while sending medical results; we fulfil this with the 
cryptographic mechanism. In addition, the last point 
is related to fulfilling GDPR principles, and an 
example is accountability, where it is necessary to 
record which doctor did the change. We fulfil this by 
the Record Data Action mechanism. 
5 EVALUATION 
   In this section, we describe the preliminary 
evaluation we carried out within the DEFeND 
project, for the tool and method described in this 
paper. Here we report the evaluation strategy and 
results. The framework is Human Oriented, which 
supports the investigation to conduct this kind of 
analysis based on the importance of usable systems 
and promotes the process of human centered design 
as a way to achieve them [20]. Human Oriented is 
useful to design the evaluation in a human centered 
way, to obtain feedback from experts of security and 
privacy engineering. We have fifteen participants, 
who are researchers of privacy and security 
engineering. They work within different universities 
from various countries including the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Greece, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and 
China; this gives scope for a variety of perspectives 
(achieving heterogeneity).   
 
Evaluation Strategy. To have a comprehensive 
evaluation, we use qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. For the qualitative aspect, we design a focus 
group session, having participants who are both 
experts and researchers. Before we began the 
evaluation, we constructed a pilot focus group 
evaluation with three participant groups, namely- 
PhD student, Doctor and Research Fellow. This 
revealed to us the possibilities of improving the focus 
group evaluation according to the participants’ 
feedback. Moving forward, we could perform the 
full-scale focus group evaluation. The rational of the 
problem, is to allow the participants to interact with a 
task in order to find out how the researcher can 
identify conflicts between requirements. Therefore, 
we describe the ConfIS framework with an example 
provided (as discussed in this paper) and provide the 
participants a useful handout containing a description 
of the focus group sessions, and what the input and 
outputs for each phase of the framework are. In 
addition, each part has full content. After the 
participants have grasped the full idea and learned 
how to use the framework, we asked them to apply 
ConfIS to the same task that we started the 
presentation with it. This comparison method gave us 
some insight into using the framework and without 
using it. By the end of the session, participants are 
required to complete a survey, evaluating the 
framework in general- phase by phase.  
 
This evaluation strategy covered the qualitative 
evaluation. By having the focus group and during 
discussions in this session, we observe how the 
participants understand the framework. Additionally, 
answering the survey thereafter gave a quantitative 
evaluation of the framework.  
 
Evaluation Results. The survey consisted of fifteen 
participants, of which 100% are respondents. 
Encouraging responses of its design, revealed it 
showed huge efforts, with a well and confident 
presentation, interesting field and helpful work, 
utilizing real cases within EU projects. Its clarity in 
understanding the research objective, deemed a 
supportive method which could be used in an iterative 
way, and for each phase there is good support for the 
analyst. Additionally, it brought revelations of much 
more alternatives that could arise for the designer. 
The tables are a valuable form of presentation, but 
models could be a better way to visualize potential 
analysis of elements and solutions, speeding up the 
process. The evaluation was in general a positive 
experience, and the evaluator clearly presented the 
framework and its main objectives. Furthermore, 
suggested areas for improvement included, 
Figure 6: General Framework Per Respondent 
Group 
 
considering additional features/phases such as 
prioritization and the conflicts involved with this. The 
material and tools used to resolve conflicts could be 
more informative especially for those without much 
knowledge of the field, which could mean including 
more examples. Furthermore, specifying the basis of 
any choice of solution; when the participant identifies 
conflicts, and then chooses a possible solution, 
specifying how to choose one if there is more than 
one option is not supported. Moreover, creating a 
more structured evaluation that guides the subjects in 
their evaluation should be noted. Participants were a 
bit unsure of the utility (or the ordering) of the conflict 
identification phase. The identification of the 
enforcement technologies that "resolve" the identified 
conflicts, eliminated the conflict and some 
participants did not see the reason identifying them, 
















The majority’s share, well over 70% of research 
fellows agree with the general framework. They 
approve that the relevant phases are clear, well 
defined, sequentially in order, can have a fast 
development process, is easier for identifying 
conflict, reducing it and its relevant costs, and 
maintaining the value of each requirement. The same 
can be said for doctors, with the exception of 50% 
indicating a neutral response to the framework phases 
having a fast development process, being easier for 
detecting/identifying and reducing conflict, and for 
maintaining the value of each requirement. 
Additionally, more than 80% of PhD students agree 
with the design of the general framework, and its 

































   A summary analysis of the evaluation survey 
reveals most respondents were research fellows 
(40%), followed by PhD students (33%) and doctors 
(27%). They all found the research design questions 
to be appropriate, useful, well presented (87%) and 
the research field quite interesting (93%) in gaining 
their feedback. On the other hand, just 54% agreed 
that the results were clearly presented; this leaves 
room for improvement Additionally, the general 
framework was also well received by the majority, 
proving to be sequentially in order (87%), clear and 
well defined (80%), easier for analysis (80%) and for 
making feasible decisions such as reducing cost, 
conflict, and faster development processing (73%) 
(Figure 7). Among the three phases, to Phase 1 (74-
80%) agreed that Mapping between security and 
privacy to identify conflict was clear. Phase 2 was 
well received with the majority (80-86%) agreeing 
that the researcher adequately addressed conflicts 
between requirements and decisions. 
   Additionally, feedback on Phase 3 showed varying 
responses (67-87%), yet the participants still agreeing 
that there was an ease to understanding conflict 












6 RELATED WORK 
   Studies have been conducted regarding conflicts in 
requirement engineering approaches. Aldekhail et al 
[9] provide a comparative review on the conflict 
analysis approach, which was conducted with 20 
studies from 2001 to 2014. Moreover, approaches in 
the literature are focused only on considering the 
following important aspects separately: 
identification, analysis, and resolution of conflicts. In 
fact, most of them focus only on identifying conflicts 
between requirements, especially NFR (non-
functional requirements), without considering an 
overall, systematic approach for identifying, 
analysing and, above all, resolving them. This paper 
aims exactly to fulfil such gap, by supporting the 
analyst in all three phases, in a tool-supported, semi-
automatic, interactive way, with the systematic 
approach we propose.  
A recent study conducted by Ramadan et al [21, 22] 
examine- detecting conflicts between data-
minimization and security requirements. They 
investigate how conflicts between security and 
privacy requirements gather into the systems, in 
business process models.  
   Salnitri et al. [23] in their work, propose a novel 
method named SePTA (Security, Privacy and Trust 
Approach). This method supports a unified 
specification of security, privacy and trust 
requirements, under one framework. It, more so, 
enables software designers and security experts to 
enforce such requirements, and is designed for 
sociotechnical systems. They focus on how security, 
privacy and trust requirements can be specified in the 
early requirement phase, using a goal-based 
modelling language, and how such requirements can 
be correctly enforced in the late requirement phase, 
using goal-based modelling languages and a 
modelling language for business processes.  Horkoff 
et al [24] examined the top-cited 246 papers over the 
past 20 years, as per Scopus. They make several 
observations about the Goal-oriented requirements 
engineering (GORE) field, where goals are used as a 
useful conceptualization to elicit, model, and analyse 
requirements, capturing alternatives and conflicts. 
Despite extensive efforts in this field, the 
requirements engineering (RE) community lacked a 





Phase 2: Identify Conflicts between 




Phase 3: Conflict Resolution Patterns 67-87% 
(strongly/agree) 
Figure 7. General Framework 
 
Table 1: Phases 
 
recent, general systematic literature review of the 
area.  
   An expressive goal-based modelling language for 
requirements that supports the representation of nice-
to-have requirements, preferences, optimization 
requirements, constraints and more, have been 
proposed by Nguyen et al. [25]. They exploited 
automated reasoning solvers in order to develop a tool 
that supports sound and complete reasoning, with 
respect to goal models, and scales well to goal models 
with thousands of elements. Their proposal advances 
the state-of-the-art on goal modelling and reasoning.     
Additionally, for future work they propose an 
empirical validation of the CGM-Tool with modelers 
and domain experts, currently working in this 
direction with PhD students and post-docs. While 
their work is in the preliminary stages, our framework 
has already been applied to a real case study named 
DEFeND, which has been validated, and is now in the 
evaluation process.  
Bhavsar et al [26] presented a survey paper 
comparing recent studies of conflict between 
requirements in the early stage of development. In 
their survey, they summarize case studies related to 
different domains of software engineering, with 
respect to requirement gathering techniques, and how 
conflicts could be resolved, that arise at the RE phase, 
using the Agile software development method. This 
model includes a continuous iteration of development 
and testing phases, so that it could deliver the product 
in the early stage, which makes Agile software 
development used widely by companies. While this is  
so, it also increases the complexity of the system. The 
authors have also cited the work of Alkubaisy et al., 
[15] who investigates conflicts between security and 
privacy requirements. 
   Maxwell et al., [27] also conducts a cross- reference  
approach for identifying conflicting software 
requirements. Their work revealed that rules and laws 
are easier to handle, and the reputation of the 
company depends on the rules and regulation which 
are followed. On the other hand, this can lead to an 
increase in costs, because system laws have 
overloads.  
   Furthermore, Schon et al., [28] investigates agile 
software development, and discovers that rapid 
changing in requirements can be easy to handle, 
whilst on the other hand, there are more complexities 
because a hybrid development model is used.      
7 CONCLUSION 
   In this paper, we outline the need to identify 
conflicts between requirements and to have a suitable 
tool to resolve such conflicts. The ConfIS framework 
has been presented for identifying conflicts between 
security and privacy requirements. ConfIS allows the 
analyst to deal with the potential conflicts that may be 
discovered later and has been applied to a case study 
from the DEFeND project. Lastly, we demonstrate 
the phases of ConfIS step-by-step, to investigate how 
it helps the analyst to identify and resolve conflicts 
via a supporting tool. 
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